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We consider a quantum polynomial-time algorithm which solves the discrete logarithm
problem for points on elliptic curves over GF (2m). We improve over earlier algorithms
by constructing an efficient circuit for multiplying elements of binary finite fields and
by representing elliptic curve points using a technique based on projective coordinates.
The depth of our proposed implementation, executable in the Linear Nearest Neighbor
(LNN) architecture, is O(m2), which is an improvement over the previous bound of
O(m3) derived assuming no architectural restrictions.
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1 Introduction
Quantum computing [14] has the ability to solve problems whose best classical solutions are
considered inefficient. Perhaps the best-known example is Shor’s polynomial-time integer
factorization algorithm [19], where the best known classical technique, the General Number
Field Sieve, has superpolynomial complexity expO( 3
√
n log2 n) in the number of bits n [22].
aAn earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 3rd Workshop on Theory of Quantum Computation,
Communication, and Cryptography, Tokyo, Japan, January 30 - February 1, 2008.
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Table 1. Comparing hardware performance of RSA-3072 and ECC-256 [21].
Mode RSA-3072 ECC-256
Space-optimized 184 ms 29 ms
50,000 gates 6,660 gates
Speed-optimized 110 ms 1.3 ms
189,200 gates 80,100 gates
Since a hardware implementation of this algorithm on a suitable quantum mechanical system
could be used to crack the RSA cryptosystem [22], these results force researchers to rethink
the assumptions of classical cryptography and to consider optimized circuits for the two
main parts of Shor’s factorization algorithm: the quantum Fourier transform [14, 4] and
modular exponentiation [13]. Quantum noise and issues of scalability in quantum information
processing proposals require circuit designers to consider optimization carefully.
Since the complexity of breaking RSA is subexponential, cryptosystems such as Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) have become increasingly popular. The best known classical
attack on ECC requires an exponential search with complexity O(2n/2). The difference is
substantial: a 256-bit ECC key requires the same effort to break as a 3072-bit RSA key. The
largest publicly broken ECC system has a key length of 109 bits [3], while the key lengths of
1024 bits and higher are strongly recommended for RSA. However, the key lengths represent
only the communication cost of a cryptographic protocol. It might, in principle, be possible
that the hardware implementation of ECC were overwhelmingly less efficient, and then its
practical efficiency would be undermined. However, this is not the case; indeed, the situation
is rather opposite. Table 1 compares the efficiency of CMOS circuits (with the same clock
speed) implementing 3072-bit RSA and 256-bit ECC, which both give equivalent security of
128 bits, in two hardware modes: optimized for space (cost), and speed (runtime). It is clear
that the ECC implementation is more efficient. Relative efficiency of ECC as compared to
RSA has been widely recognized. For instance, ECC has been acknowledged by National
Security Agency as a secure protocol and included in their Suite B [15].
Most ECC implementations are built over GF (2m), likely, due to the efficiency of relevant
hardware and the ease of mapping a key into a binary register. Software implementations,
such as ECC over GF (2155), are publicly available [1], making ECC ready to use for any
interested party.
There exists a quantum polynomial-time algorithm that solves Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and thus cracks elliptic curve cryptography [17]. As with
Shor’s factorization algorithm, this algorithm should be studied in detail by anyone interested
in studying the threat posed by quantum computing to modern cryptography. The quantum
algorithm for solving discrete logarithm problems in cyclic groups such as the one used in
ECC requires computing sums and products of finite field elements, such as GF (2m) [6].
Addition in GF (2m) requires only a depth-1 circuit consisting of parallel CNOT gates [2].
We present a depth O(m) multiplication circuit for GF (2m) optimized for the Linear Nearest
Neighbor (LNN) architecture. Our circuit is based on the construction by Mastrovito [10].
Previously, a depth O(m2) circuit in an unrestricted architecture was found in [2]. With the
use of our multiplication circuit the depth of the quantum discrete logarithm algorithm over
the points on elliptic curves over GF (2m) drops from O(m3) to O(m2). Our implementation
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is optimized for LNN, unlike previously constructed circuit whose depth, if restricted to LNN,
may become as high as O(m4).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of quantum computa-
tion, GF (2m) field arithmetic, and elliptic curve arithmetic. Section 3 outlines the quantum
algorithm, and presents our improvements: the GF (2m) multiplication circuit, and projective
coordinate representation. The paper concludes with some observations and suggestions for
further research.
2 Preliminaries
We will be working in the quantum circuit model, where data is stored in qubits and unitary
operations are applied to various qubits at discrete time steps as quantum gates. We assume
that any set of non-intersecting gates may be applied within one time step. The total number
of time steps required to execute an algorithm as a circuit is the depth. Further details on
quantum computation in the circuit model can be found in [14].
We will make use of the CNOT, Toffoli and SWAP gates. The CNOT gate is defined
as the unitary operator which performs the transformation |a〉 |b〉 7→ |a〉 |a⊕ b〉. The Toffoli
gate [20] can be described as a controlled CNOT gate, and performs the transformation over
the computational basis given by the formula |a〉 |b〉 |c〉 7→ |a〉 |b〉 |c⊕ ab〉. Finally, SWAP
interchanges the values of the qubits, i.e., performs operation |a〉 |b〉 7→ |b〉 |a〉.
2.1 Binary Field Arithmetic
The finite field GF (2m) consists of a set of 2m elements with addition and multiplication
operations, and additive and multiplicative identities 0 and 1, respectively. GF (2m) forms a
commutative ring over these two operations where each non-zero element has a multiplicative
inverse. The finite field GF (2m) is unique up to isomorphism.
We can represent the elements of GF (2m) where m ≥ 2 with the help of an irreducible
primitive polynomial of the form P (x) =
∑m−1
i=0 cix
i + xm, where ci ∈ GF (2) [16]. The finite
field GF (2m) is isomorphic to the set of polynomials over GF (2) modulo P (x). In other
words, elements of GF (2m) can be represented as polynomials over GF (2) of degree at most
m− 1, where the product of two elements is the product of their polynomial representations,
reduced modulo P (x) [16, 18]. As the sum of two polynomials is simply the bitwise XOR
of the coefficients, it is convenient to express these polynomials as bit vectors of length m.
Additional properties of finite fields can be found in [16].
Mastrovito has proposed an algorithm along with a classical circuit implementation for
polynomial basis (PB) multiplication [10, 11], popularly known as the Mastrovito multiplier.
Based on Mastrovito’s algorithm, [18] presents a formulation of PB multiplication and a gen-
eralized parallel-bit hardware architecture for special types of primitive polynomials, namely
trinomials, equally spaced polynomials (ESPs), and two classes of pentanomials.
Consider the inputs ~a and~b, with ~a = [a0, a1, a2, . . . , am−1]
T and~b = [b0, b1, b2, . . . , bm−1]
T ,
where the coordinates ai and bi, 0 ≤ i < m, are the coefficients of two polynomials A(x) and
B(x) representing representing two elements ofGF (2m) with respect to a primitive polynomial
P (x). We use the following three matrices:
1. an m× (m− 1) reduction matrix M ,
2. an m×m lower triangular matrix L, and
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3. an (m− 1)×m upper triangular matrix U .
Vectors ~d and ~e are defined as:
~d = L~b (1)
~e = U~b, (2)
where L and U are defined as
L =


a0 0 . . . 0 0
a1 a0 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
am−2 am−3 . . . a0 0
am−1 am−2 . . . a1 a0


, U =


0 am−1 am−2 . . . 0 a1
0 0 am−1 . . . 0 a2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . am−1 am−2
0 0 0 . . . 0 am−1


.
Note that ~d and ~e correspond to polynomials D(x) and E(x) such that A(x)B(x) = D(x) +
xmE(x). Using P (x), we may construct a matrix M which converts the coefficients of any
polynomial xmE(x) to the coefficients of an equivalent polynomial modulo P (x) with degree
less than m. Thus, the vector
~c = ~d+Q~e (3)
gives the coefficients of the polynomial representing the product of ~a and ~b. The construction
of the matrix M , which is dependent on the primitive polynomial P (x), is given in [18].
2.2 Elliptic Curve Groups
In the most general case, we define an elliptic curve over a field F as the set of points
(x, y) ∈ F × F which satisfy the equation
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a5.
By extending this curve to the projective plane, we may include the point at infinity O as an
additional solution. By defining a suitable addition operation, we may interpret the points of
an elliptic curve as an Abelian group, with O as the identity element.
In the specific case of the finite field GF (2m), it is possible to reduce the degrees of
freedom in the coefficients defining the elliptic curve by the use of linear transformations on
the variables x and y. In addition, it was shown in [12] that for a class of elliptic curves called
supersingular curves, it is possible to reduce the discrete logarithm problem for the elliptic
curve group to a discrete logarithm problem over a finite field in such a way that makes such
curves unsuitable for cryptography. For GF (2m), these correspond to elliptic curves with
parameter a1 = 0. We will restrict our attention to non-supersingular curves over GF (2
m),
which are of the form y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, where b 6= 0.
The set of points over an elliptic curve also forms an Abelian group with O as the identity
element. For a non-supersingular curve over GF (2m), the group operation is defined in the
following manner. Given a point P = (x1, y1) on the curve, we define (−P ) as (x1, x1 + y1).
Given a second point Q = (x2, y2), where P 6= ±Q, we define the sum P + Q as the point
(x3, y3) where x3 = λ
2+λ+x1+x2+a and y3 = (x1+x3)λ+x3+y1, with λ =
y1+y2
x1+x2
. When
P = Q, we define 2P as the point (x3, y3) where x3 = λ
2 + λ + a and y3 = x
2
1 + λx3 + x3,
D. Maslov, J. Mathew, D. Cheung, and D. K. Pradhan . . . 5
b1
b2
b3
c0
c1
c2
c3
a1
a2
a3
b0
a0
b1
b2
b3
a1
a2
a3
b0
a0
0
0
0
0
a
b
e Q d
a b.
a
b
0
Fig. 1. Circuit for GF (24) multiplier with P (x) = x4 + x+ 1.
with λ = x1 +
y1
x1
. Also, any group operation involving O simply conforms to the properties
of a group identity element. Finally, scalar multiplication by an integer can be easily defined
in terms of repeated addition or subtraction.
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP) is defined as the problem of
retrieving a constant scalar d given that Q = dP for known points P and Q. With this
definition, we may define cryptographic protocols such as Diffie-Hellman or digital signature,
using the ECDLP by modifying analogous protocols using the discrete logarithm problem
over finite fields.
3 Quantum Polynomial-Time Attack
With a reversible implementation for the basic elliptic curve group operations, it is possible
to solve the ECDLP with a polynomial-depth quantum circuit. Given a base point P and
some scalar multiple Q = dP on an elliptic curve over GF (2m), Shor’s algorithm for discrete
logarithms [19] constructs the state
1
2m
2
m
−1∑
x=0
2
m
−1∑
y=0
|x〉 |y〉 |xP + yQ〉 ,
then performs a two-dimensional quantum Fourier transform over the first two registers. It
was shown in [17] that the creation of the above state can be reduced to adding a classically
known point to a superposition of points, by using a “double and add” method analogous to
the square and multiply method of modular exponentiation. Points of the form 2kP and 2kQ
can be classically precomputed, and then, starting with the additive identity, group addition
operations can be performed, controlled by the appropriate bits from |x〉 or |y〉. Note that all
of the intermediate sums must be preserved until the computation is completed before they
can be uncomputed.
3.1 Linear Depth Circuit for GF (2m) Multiplication in the LNN Architecture
We now discuss how to implement multiplication over GF (2m) as a quantum circuit. Firstly,
using equations (1–3), derive expressions for ~d, ~e and ~c. We next perform the following steps
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breaking the entire computation into three distinct stages/circuits:
1. Compute ~e in an ancillary register of m qubits.
2. Transform ~e into M~e, using a linear reversible implementation.
3. Compute and add ~d to the register occupied by M~e.
We illustrate the above steps with an example using P (x) = x4 + x + 1. Expressions for ~d
and ~e derived from equations (1–2) are shown below.
~d =


a0b0
a1b0 + a0b1
a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2
a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3

 , ~e =


a3b1 + a2b2 + a1b3
a3b2 + a2b3
a3b3

 .
We also construct the matrix M =


1 0 0
1 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1

 .
From (3), we compute the multiplier output ~c = ~d+M~e =


d0 + e0
d1 + e1 + e0
d2 + e1 + e2
d3 + e2

 .
1. We first compute e0, e1, and e2 in the ancilla, as shown in Figure 1 (gates 1–6).
2. We next implement the matrix transformation M~e (gates 7–9).
3. Finally, we compute the coefficients di, 0 ≤ i < m, and add them to the ancilla to
compute ~c (gates 10–19).
At this point, we have a classical reversible circuit which implements the transformation
|a〉 |b〉 |0〉 7→ |a〉 |b〉 |a · b〉. However, if we input a superposition of field elements, then the
output register will be entangled with the input. If one of the inputs, such as |b〉 is classically
known, then we may also obtain
∣∣b−1〉 classically. Since we may construct a circuit which
maps |a · b〉
∣∣b−1〉 |0〉 7→ |a · b〉 ∣∣b−1〉 |a〉, we may apply the inverse of this circuit to the output
of the first circuit to obtain |a〉 |b〉 |a · b〉 7→ |0〉 |b〉 |a · b〉 using an ancilla set to
∣∣b−1〉. This
gives us a quantum circuit which takes a quantum input |a〉 and classical input |b〉, and
outputs |a · b〉 |b〉. When |b〉 is not a classical input, the output of the circuit may remain
entangled with the input, and other techniques may be required to remove this entanglement.
However, we emphasize that this is not required for a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
for the ECDLP [17].
In some circumstances, we may derive exact expressions for the number of gates required
in the GF multiplication circuit.
Lemma 1 A binary field multiplier for primitive polynomial P (x) can be designed using at
most 2m2 − 1 gates. If P (x) is a trinomial or the all-one polynomial, where each coefficient
is 1, we require only m2 +m− 1 gates.
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Proof. There are three phases to the computation: computing ~e, computing M~e, and
adding ~d to the result. For ~e and ~d, each pair of coefficients which are multiplied and then
added to another qubit requires one Toffoli gate. This requires
m−1∑
i=0
i =
m(m− 1)
2
, and
m∑
i=0
i =
m(m+ 1)
2
gates respectively, for a total of m2 gates. Next, consider the implementation of the transfor-
mation M .
In general, m2 − 1 CNOT gates suffice for any linear reversible computation defined by
the matrix M in equation (3) [23]. This gives a general upper bound of 2m2− 1 gates. In the
specific case of the All-One-Polynomial, the operation M consists of adding e1 to each of the
other qubits, requiring m− 1 CNOT operations. This gives a total of m2 +m− 1 operations.
For a trinomial, we have a primitive polynomial P (x) = xm + xk + 1 for some constant k
such that 1 ≤ k < m. To upper bound the number of gates required to implementM , we may
consider the inverse operation, in which we begin with a polynomial of degree at most m− 1,
and we wish to find an equivalent polynomial where each term has degree between m− 1 and
2m− 2. Increasing the minimum degree of a polynomial requires one CNOT operation, and
this must be done m− 1 times. Again, this gives a total of m2 +m− 1 operations. QED
3.1.1 Parallelization
We construct a parallelized version of this network by considering the three parts of the
computation: computation of ~e, multiplication by M and in-place computation of ~d. For ~e
and ~d, note that given coefficients ai and bj where the value of i− j is fixed, the target qubit
of each separate term aibj is different. This means that they may be performed in parallel.
In the case of ~e, we evaluate aibj whenever i + j ≥ m. This means that the values of i − j
may range from −(m− 2) to m− 2, giving a depth 2m− 3 circuit for finding e. Similarly, for
~d, we evaluate aibj whenever i + j < m. The values of i − j range from −(m− 1) to m − 1,
giving a depth 2m− 1 circuit. Evaluation of ~d in the case of GF (28) is illustrated in Figure 2.
In [9], it is shown that every linear computation, such as that of the product M~e, can
be done in a linear number of stages, with a depth of at most 5m. Thus, a total depth of
(2m− 3) + 5m+ (2m− 1) = 9m+ O(1) suffices to implement the multiplication circuit. As
such, an implementation which replaces the Toffoli gate with 2-qubit gates ([14], page 182)
can be done by a circuit with the depth upper bounded by the expression 25m+O(1).
3.1.2 Execution of the multiplication circuit in LNN
In this subsection we explain how to execute the GF multiplication circuit in linear depth
O(m) in the LNN architecture. Our circuit consists of three distinct stages: creation of ~e,
followed by a linear reversible transformation, and the in-place calculation of ~d. As shown
in [9], the middle part of this calculation can be executed as a depth 5m computation in
the LNN architecture. We next show that first and third parts in our construction can also
be modified to become a linear depth computation in the LNN. At this point, we note that
both subcircuits share identical structure, and as such we only need to consider either one.
We choose the circuit for computing ~d. In the following, we will use its parallelized version
described in the previous subsection and separate every two computational stages by a depth-
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Fig. 2. Subcircuit computing ~d illustrated in the case of multiplication in GF (28). L∗ indicate
which stage does the given gate gets executed at. The qubit line turns gray after a given qubit
was used last during the computation.
2 qubit swapping stage such as to make it possible to execute the entire computation in the
LNN in linear depth.
First, prepare the qubits in the LNN connectivity pattern c0−c1− ...−cm−1−am−1−b0−
am−2−b1− ...−a0−bm−1. For that, at most linear depth qubit swapping stage is required, no
matter what is the starting connectivity pattern. Next, execute a computational stage. For
every Toffoli gate TOF (ci; aj , bk) applied and a qubit x on the left from ci in the present LNN
connectivity pattern use the depth-2 swapping stage SWAP(ci, aj) SWAP(x, aj) SWAP(ci, bk)
to prepare the qubits for the next computational stage (LNN connectivity pattern x − ci −
aj − bk gets transformed to aj − x − bk − ci). The workings of such adaptation to the
LNN architecture are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Note that the number of swapping
stages is no more than twice the number of the computational stages. Therefore, the entire
computation can be executed in linear depth, not exceeding 34m + O(1) (counting 1- and
2-qubit operations), in the LNN architecture.
3.2 Projective Representation
When points on an elliptic curve are represented as affine coordinates (x, y), performing group
operations on such points requires finding the multiplicative inverse of elements of GF (2m).
This operation takes much longer to perform than the other field operations required, and it
is desirable to minimize the number of division operations. For example, [7] gives a quantum
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c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 a7b0a6b1a5b2a4b3a3b4a2b5a1b6a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0 a6b1a5b2a4b3a3b4a2b5a1b6a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6a7 b0a6 b1 a4b3a3b4a2b5a1b6a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2 a4b3a3b4a2b5a1b6a0b7
c7 a5b2
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3 a3b4a2b5a1b6a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4 a2b5a1b6a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5 a1b6a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6 a0b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7a7 b0a6 b1a5 b2a4 b3a3 b4a2 b5a1 b6a0 b7
L1:
L2:
L3:
L4:
L5:
L6:
L7:
L8:
L9:
L10:
L11:
L12:
L13:
L14:
L15:
Fig. 3. Qubit permutation stages for adaptation of the GF multiplication circuit the the LNN
architecture, illustrated in the case GF (28) and the computation of ~d. The arrows indicate which
position do the individual qubits get swapped to. In particular, arrow տ indicates that the given
qubit will not be used in the remainder of the computation, and it gets moved to the rightmost
position. Triples of qubits highlighted light gray experience application of the Toffoli gates. Dark
grey color is used to highlight qubits that are not used in the remainder of computation.
circuit of depth O(m2) which uses the extended Euclidean algorithm.
By using projective coordinate representation, we can perform group operations without
division. Instead of using two elements of GF (2m) to represent a point, we use three elements,
(X,Y, Z) to represent the point (XZ ,
Y
Z ) in affine coordinates. Dividing X and Y by a certain
quantity is now equivalent to multiplying the third coordinate (Z) by this quantity. Extensions
to this concept have also been explored, where different information about an elliptic curve
point is stored in several coordinates. Another advantage to projective coordinates is that
the point at infinity O can simply be represented by setting Z to zero. However, in order
to retrieve the elliptic curve point in the affine representation, we still need to perform one
multiplicative inversion at the end.
To represent the point (X,Y ), we simply begin with the representation
|P (X,Y )〉 = |X〉 |Y 〉 |1〉 .
As we perform elliptic curve group operations, the third coordinate will not remain constant.
Exact formulas for point addition in projective coordinates can be easily derived by taking
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the formulas for the affine coordinates under a common denominator and multiplying the Z
coordinate by this denominator. These are detailed in [5]. Since the ECDLP can be solved by
implementing elliptic curve point addition where one point is “classically known” [17], we may
implement these formulas using the multiplication algorithm presented in Section 3.1 and by
being careful to uncompute any temporary registers used. Since the number of multiplication
operations used in these formulas is fixed, we may implement elliptic curve point addition
with a known classical point with a linear depth circuit.
Finally, to construct the state required for solving the ECDLP, we use the standard “double
and add” technique, which requires implementing the point addition circuit for each value
2iP and 2iQ, where 0 ≤ i < m. Note that these points are classically known, so that at each
step, we are performing point addition with one classically known point. When the final state
1
2m
2
m
−1∑
x=0
2
m
−1∑
y=0
|x〉 |y〉 |xP + yQ〉
is constructed, each |xP + yQ〉 will consist of three coordinates |X〉 |Y 〉 |Z〉. Since the presence
of the third coordinate Z will interfere with the discrete logarithm algorithm, we must revert
to an affine coordinate representation. An algorithm to compute the multiplicative inverse
of an element of GF (2m) using an O(m2)-depth circuit is given in [7]. Using
∣∣Z−1〉, we
may compute
∣∣XZ−1〉 ∣∣Y Z−1〉, as required, before uncomputing ∣∣Z−1〉. Since |X〉 |Y 〉 |Z〉
must now be uncomputed, this step must occur before any of the temporary registers used in
computing them are themselves uncomputed. The result is the desired state
1
2m
2
m
−1∑
x=0
2
m
−1∑
y=0
|x〉 |y〉 |xP + yQ〉
in affine coordinates. As a final detail, we also need to address the point at infinity, O, which
is the identity element of the elliptic curve group. In projective coordinates, O is represented
by any (X,Y, Z) where Z = 0. In this case, we will not be able to perform multiplicative
inversion on Z. However, since the ensuing quantum Fourier transform only requires that
each point have a consistent representation, we may simply select the coordinates of a point
which is known not to lie on the elliptic curve to represent O. The final registers can simply
be set to these coordinates in the case that Z = 0.
This represents an improvement on the algorithm of [7], as multiplicative inversion is used
only once, at the end of this algorithm, rather than at each elliptic curve point operation. In
total, we perform O(m) instances of the linear depth multiplication circuit, one instance of
the O(m2)-depth multiplicative inversion circuit, and finally, a quantum Fourier transform.
This gives a final depth complexity of O(m2) for the circuit which solves the ECDLP over
GF (2m) in the LNN architecture. This improves the previously known upper bound of O(m3)
[17].
4 Conclusion
We considered the optimization of the quantum attack on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem, on which elliptic curve cryptography is based. Our constructions include a linear
depth circuit for binary field multiplication and efficient data representation using projective
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coordinates. Our main result is the depth O(m2) circuit executable in the LNN architecture
for computing the discrete logarithm over elliptic curves over GF (2m). Further research may
be devoted toward a better optimization, further study of architectural implications, and the
fault tolerance issues.
Interestingly, our circuit is slightly (by a logarithmic factor) more efficient than the best
known circuit for integer factoring optimized for the LNN architecture, allowing linear ancilla
and assuming gates with diminishingly small parameters cannot be used [8]. (We believe this
is related to necessity of performing carry over during the integer addition, while it is not
required for the addition over GF (2m).) However, our circuit reduces an exponential classical
search to a polynomial time quantum, whereas integer factoring can be done classically with
a subexponential time algorithm. Considering relative efficiency of ECC as compared to
RSA, we suggest referring to the ability to solve ECDLP as a stronger practical argument for
quantum computing.
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